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ESSAY

The Faculty Workshop
PIERRE SCHLAG†
FEBRUARY 26, 2012
The fever is back. And I‟m out of laudanum. Plus there‟s
a faculty workshop in about an hour or so.
Still, bear with me.
The thing I want to talk about is a dream I had last
night. Actually, this morning. And frankly, it was less a
dream than delirium. And it was less delirium than the last
wisps of laudanum evanescent.
There were law professors in my head.
And homeless persons. Curiously, most of the homeless
carried copies of Law’s Empire. Equally curious, it was the
law professors who were sleeping under bridges. Some
professors—about a dozen or so—were already awake,
delivering their lectures in a garden next to a river. It
looked a lot like the Seine, but for some reason it was the
Volga. Soon there were more law professors—some reading
from notes, others pacing, lecturing to no one in particular,
speaking to the air. It was a sunny spring morning—white
clouds in the sky with an intimation of a gentle afternoon
† Byron R. White Professor of Law, University of Colorado. The author wishes to
thanks friends and colleagues for comments and suggestions. Prior reading of
the preceding Essay, My Dinner at Langdell’s, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 851 (2004) is
strongly advised.

807

808

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

rain. The law professors smiled. It all felt very cheery—like
a well-run rest home. Or an asylum.
One of the professors was a bit loud: “Stop, look, and
listen,” he kept saying. Over and over again. And sometimes
he paused in between. “Stop.” “Look.” “And listen.” The
phrase was apparently very meaningful to him. He seemed
to expect some sort of reaction. He grabbed an old bag lady
by the arm and said, “Stop, look, and listen.” She became
very frightened and ran away. A couple of men in white
uniforms gently ushered him away.
A kindly gentleman with a grizzled stubble of white
beard and a slight stoop walked up to me very slowly. He
was carrying a crinkled yellow pad filled with densely
packed small script. Old school—notebook lined. “Have you
seen my podium?” he asked.
“But what would you do with a podium?” I asked.
“I would lecture, of course.”
“But there‟s no one here to hear you.”
“But look,” he protested, waving down the length of the
garden towards the east, “there are all these other law
professors here. Surely, you can see that. Can‟t you?”
“Yes, but they‟re all busy giving their own lectures. I
don‟t think they will listen to you.”
He smiled knowingly, like a mischievous child about to
pull a magic trick on a grown-up. “That doesn‟t matter,” he
said. “No one understands anyway.”
He tottered away.
Another one claimed to be quoting Holmes: “Law sleeps.
The masses pass by.”
“But that‟s not Holmes,” I said.
“Yes, I know, but it could have been.”
“But—”
“Reason is the last gasp of a dying idea!”
“That‟s not Holmes either!”
“I‟m trying to improve him. I‟ve got hundreds of these.
„Surety is the first refuge of scoundrels.‟ „Justice is law in its
Sunday best.‟ „Morality is the crutch of the feeble and
infirm!‟ I have hundreds, I tell you.”
“But, look you can‟t just claim to quote Holmes and
make him up out of whole cloth.”
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“Well, I‟m not claiming it‟s Holmes. And it‟s not out of
whole cloth. I‟m just saying it‟s as if Holmes had said it.”
“Yes, but he didn‟t!”
“That‟s why there‟s an „as if‟ part.”
“This is all fraudulent!” I said.
It was at that precise moment that one of the other
professors came up to us, asking, “Is this the faculty
workshop?” The man was visibly excited. He wore a black
suit. “I want to ask a four-part question, followed by a
comment and I have been told this is the place to do it.
Please, they said I could.” The man was speaking very
quickly. He had an Eastern European accent I couldn‟t
quite place.
“If you want, I could cut it down to a three-part question
followed by a comment,” he offered. “It doesn‟t have to be
four.”
He pleaded with us. “Please, I have traveled a long way.
And there are not many places where one can do this. I
could ask my question quickly. It‟s appropriate for almost
any paper. Which of you is giving the paper here?”
“We‟re not giving papers,” I said. “He‟s quoting Holmes.”
“Oh, I see,” said the man, visibly taken aback. “This
quoting Holmes—does that replace the workshop? Is that
the new thing now?”
I awoke with a start. The heating ducts were clanking.
My forehead was moist and my cheeks clammy. I had
obviously fallen asleep in my office chair. Immediately, the
anxiety kicked in. There was something I had to do or find.
It didn‟t matter, however, because it was at precisely
this moment that I was downloaded from SSRN by a Max
Something or Other. Or perhaps I downloaded him. One of
us was clearly in the other‟s head. In the moment, it was
hard to tell. These days the author/reader distinction is so
passé. Oh sure, you can tell whether the PDF file is in your
download directory or not. But that‟s just a physical sign.
And a sign of what really? One PDF file begets another. And
vice versa. Change the names, tweak the topics, replace the
nouns, and it‟s all the same. The action that is. Oh sure,
there‟s lots of diversity at the noun level. But at the level of
action—of verb—it‟s all pretty much the same. Because let‟s
face it, if Max Something or Other and I are generic legal
academics (and let‟s just say for the moment we are) then
Max is trying to satiate my expectations just as I am trying
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to satiate his. And, of course, our expectations are virtually
identical. And that‟s increasingly so these days, now that
we‟re all New Haven boot-camped, Palo Alto-mentored,
ADR-prepped, job-talk-experienced, and young scholar
workshop-hardened. The crucibles bear different names, but
the grind is uniform. In the future . . .
I looked at my watch; it was 11:12 a.m. The keening of
anxiety still prickled. I decided to go for a short walk down
the hall.
Already, I could smell the lunch food from five offices
away. And that was not a good sign at all. It was way too
early. Very likely Chicken Kiev. By the time the workshop
started, it would be a cream-soaked E. coli challenge.
Plus, the aroma was not comforting. In law, aromas are
generally not: Smell in law is almost always a sensory
gateway to disgust and thence to sanction and punishment.
It was not reassuring at all.
Neither was my sudden realization—it finally broke
through—that I didn‟t know whether I was giving the
workshop or whether it was someone else.
And then I realized that it didn‟t really matter.
As I‟d written somewhere (I‟m almost sure of it), the
faculty workshop is a rigorous disciplining institution. Most
legal academics think that in workshops, it‟s the speaker
and his paper that matter. But, that has to be an
overstatement. The speaker is a prop, an accessory.
He has to be. It has to be that way. Most papers, despite
the varying axiomatics and methodologies, have a highly
stylized and rigidly observed common structure. It‟s
basically an enterprise where legal thinkers try to perform a
two-step procedure. Step 1 involves fashioning or reforming
legal regimes so as to establish or sustain a desirable X
(where the desirable X is something presumed to be
appealing—a rule, a process, an interpretation, a political
desiderata, or some combination thereof). Step 2 involves
advocating, within the accepted discourse of law and the
perceived audience preferences, for the chosen desirable X.
Meanwhile the speaker tries to accomplish Step 1 and Step
2 by enacting or resisting a series of equally stylized
argument-forms (e.g., rules v. standards, institutional
competence, capture concerns, etc.).
Occasionally, there are some more ambitious pieces that
present as descriptive, empirical, or theoretical. But not
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many and these are almost always transparently shaped by
Step 1 and Step 2. Then there are, of course, the historians.
I‟m always mildly amused by (though also empathetic
towards) the historians. They have a devil of a time because
no one else knows how to engage with them:
“So, do I understand you correctly to be saying that, in
the period 1776-1788, some farmers in New Jersey exported
grain to New York—is that right?”
“That‟s right.”
“Well, that‟s wrong. They didn‟t.”
“But . . . But they did!”
“Well, let me ask you this then: What would you say if I
said they didn‟t?”
Fascinating. Absolutely fascinating. Like . . . oh, never
mind.
So if we can put the small number of historians and
interesting people aside for a moment, what we have in
most faculty workshops are extremely stylized (and formally
redundant) presentations. One can easily begin to suspect
then that it‟s not at all about the speaker. And to say it
outright: Most of the time it isn‟t. Instead, what matters
most is the disciplining effect enacted through the highly
stylized questions that the speaker is asked to answer.
Again, most people think that it is the speaker who is being
disciplined (and surely some speakers may feel that way on
occasion). But the speaker is merely the occasion for the
reciprocal disciplining of audience members by each other.
We are signaling to each other via our questions and
thereby constructing for ourselves and each other the
appropriate genre for the law review article/faculty
workshop performance.
Much of this reciprocal disciplining is a subtle
negotiation—performed largely by way of non-verbal cues
(smiling, nodding, sighing, sitting up, reclining back,
dropping the eyelids down to half mast, taking care of
email, whispering in a neighbor‟s ear, reading faces, and so
on).
The non-verbal cues effectively valorize or devalorize
the questions asked by the audience members. The speaker
(being an outsider) is often oblivious to the specific
meanings engendered: Not knowing the identity of the
faculty characters (or the institutional dynamics), he or she
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can only make educated guesses as to where the valences of
faculty power may lie.
Law professors, of course, will have a hard time
thinking that such non-verbal cues matter much. Life of the
mind and all that. But the cues actually do—because
everyone (at least at non-dysfunctional law schools) refrains
from saying what they actually think. If one of your
colleagues asks a dumb question, for instance, you can‟t
really be expected to say, “Well, that‟s pretty fucking
stupid—isn‟t it? Work on that one ahead of time—did you?”
And likewise if the speaker drones on, you can‟t really say,
“So your paper—it‟s kind of boring. Actually, chew-on-thefurniture hurt-yourself-boring.” What could a speaker
possibly say to that? “No, it‟s not?” “Well, it‟s interesting to
me?” “I‟ve got a lot of smart people on my side?” You see the
point. Besides, it‟s not nice. That‟s why the infinitely more
delicate (even if not altogether conceptually nuanced) nonverbal cues are so important.
Of course, it‟s not just the non-verbal cues that matter.
The actual questions asked are important as well. But you
already know the standard questions. As a gentle reminder
here, I will simply list them as rapidly as possible in a
single paragraph. Please do read as quickly as you can.
Here goes: the rules v. standards question, the institutional
competence question, the this-bit-of-history is against you
question, the have you considered . . . question, the on page
18 you say . . . and yet in footnote 262, you say . . .
question, the capillary trench warfare question, the I‟ve
actually worked on this as a lawyer question, the real
law/real politick question, the rational utility maximizer
would have done otherwise question, the cognitive
error/bias of your choice question, the where‟s your
empirical support question, the in terrorem effects question,
the perverse incentives question, the institutional design
question, the but you have not dealt with . . . question, the
how would you deal with . . . question, the nastier, wouldn‟t
you have done better arguing that . . . question, and, of
course, the ubiquitous what should the courts do question.
All these questions function to construct and delimit the
“ideal” law review article—the one that will successfully
negotiate the gantlets of faculty workshops everywhere and
score five million-plus downloads. There are actually several
genres that conform to these requirements, but life is brief,
patience is thin, and time is fleeting, so here very quickly
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then is the formula for the Mother of all Law Review
articles (circa 2000-2010). This is what you must write:
(1) In the article, pick a fight with a certain accepted
legal approach, tradition, whathaveyou which, as you are
about to show, is on at least one significant point
demonstrably wrong. Bonus points if the approach,
tradition, whathaveyou is already not well liked.
(2) Deploy a mid-level but intellectually non-trivial
theory as your framework. It should come from some extralegal field (e.g., psychology). It should not be so forwardleaning as to make your audience feel cognitively
challenged, but it should nonetheless be sufficiently
aggressive as to imply the breaking of new ground. (Stay
away from the French.)
(3) Make the mid-level theory yield (this is extremely
important) what is at once a common sense and a centerliberal solution. This greatly increases your (incredibly
marginal) chances that some official body will actually
adopt your solution—adoption being something that is oddly
treated as a sign of good scholarship as opposed to what it is
(or might be)—namely, a sign of good service. Hewing to a
common sense center-liberal solution also greatly increases
your chances that the immediate audience will believe you
are right.
(4) Leave enough ambiguity in your text to prompt and
sustain a maximum degree of self-gratifying audience
projection. A relatively crude way of doing this (though it
works) is to take a fairly well settled common law notion
(e.g., “decide cases narrowly”) which people already know
and extrapolate it to a vastly more self-inflated version of
itself—to which you will then attach a fancy new Latinate
name. In terms of symbolic economy, it‟s a win/win: the old
knowledge of law is made to feel hot and new while the hot
and new is made to feel solidly grounded in the law.
Remember: No one in the legal academy has ever gone
wrong by regressing towards the mean unless, of course, 1)
they overdo it, or 2) they‟re too obvious about it—as in
actually announcing it: “Regressing to the Mean—A
Proposal for . . . .” Even then, apparently, there‟s not much
risk.
(5) In terms of tone, you basically want the stylistic
equivalent of (4) above. That is to say that you want to
appear servile—while nonetheless making it obvious to
others that this servile affect is in service of establishing
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your dominance. In sharp contrast to when you were a
lawyer, you want to make sure everyone understands this.
That‟s it. I got all of these by reading old works (actually
new works, too) by Professor Cass Sunstein.
Also key to the disciplining aspect are some obvious
questions that are never (and can never) be asked as they
will draw immediate and overt acts of discipline themselves.
These questions are those that would undermine the
collective suspension of disbelief that enables the speaker
and the audience to pretend that their research agendas are
at once intelligent, meaningful, and normatively efficacious.
Anyway, I‟m sorry for this digression. I‟m pretty sure
I‟ve published all this before. Actually, come to think of it—
maybe not. I think it‟s all on a hard drive attached to a PC
slowly decomposing in a muddy wind-swept lot somewhere
in Eastern China. In any event I apologize. To you. To
China.
So before all this started, I was trying to find my
bearings. I believe I was trying to figure out whether I was
today‟s workshop speaker or not. I walked back to my office
to see if my email could clue me in. Yes!
From: Jennifer Halper <jennifer.halper@tba.edu>
Subject: Works-in-Progress today:
Date: February 17, 2012 11:56:37 AM MST
To: law-permanentfaculty@lists.tba.edu <lawpermanentfaculty@lists.tba.edu>
Reply-To: Jennifer Halper <jennifer.halper@tba.edu>
___________________________________________________________
Dear Faculty:
This is a reminder that today Professor Z will be
presenting a current Works-in-Progress in the Colloquium
room at noon. As usual, lunch will be served in the foyer.
Hope you can make it!
Jennifer

Yes. I felt relieved. More than expected actually. I sighed
and the anxiety all but dissipated. I went through my desk
drawers to see if perchance I had misplaced a vial of
laudanum. No luck.
When I arrived at the Aetna Life & Casualty
Colloquium Room, it was already buzzing with
conversation—I made a point of bypassing the Chicken
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Kiev, leaving a wide sanitary cordon. Therese, our ADR
(Associate Dean for Research) had already taken the
podium.
“O.K. so once again, let‟s get started. We‟re very pleased
to have Professor Z with us today. I won‟t go into his
prodigious accomplishments, other than to note . . . .”
(She went on for quite some time.)
“As usual, there is no paper. We‟ll start right in with
questions and Professor Z can step in whenever he feels
that a paper is beginning to take shape. Today‟s topic is,
The Optimal Precision of Rules for the STB.”
“Yes, Tony.”
“I have a two-part question. If by precision we mean
exactitude in the sense that all cases would be treated
similarly, then a bright line rule might be preferable. On
the other hand, if precision has reference to the social
field—the actual transportation industry—then it‟s really
not clear and it‟s possible that a standard might be
appropriate. So which is it? Is it possible to deal with both
aspects? Or must we choose between the two?”
“Thank you, Tony. That is a very nice start. And an
issue that will no doubt have to be addressed. David?”
“I think Tony has put his finger on it. I would just add
that there is a preliminary question, namely—who should
decide? The discourses that can be brought to bear in
assessing optimal precision will differ depending upon
whether we are talking about a legislature, an agency, or a
court. I guess my question would be: how can we make that
particular determination—that is, who should decide?”
“And of course, who decides who decides?” someone
piped up.
“Very good. Susan?”
“Building on David‟s question, wouldn‟t we want to do a
comparative analysis of which legal actor here is least
likely, in light of the particular subject matter, to suffer
from grievous cognitive errors, institutional bias, or to put it
crudely, capture?”
“Thank you Susan. That is a great question. Plus, I
believe, it can be broken down into three parts.”
“Mary?”
“Never mind, I‟ll ask it later.”
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“We‟ll come back to you. Sam?”
“If we can get back to the subject, I would like to know
how much the speaker‟s analysis is going to be informed by
the substance of the subject matter here (STB rulemaking)
as opposed to more generalizable ideals of form? Can we get
a fix on this or am I asking too much?”
“Very nice, Sam. But I do want to remind you that we
are not necessarily dealing with the STB engaging in
rulemaking here. That‟s still very much in question and up
for debate.”
“No, it‟s not.”
“Yes, it is, Sam,” David said. “You can‟t just assert your
opinion like this and take the conversation wherever you
want to go! Everybody gets a chance here.”
“No, they don‟t.”
“Sam, you don‟t even know whether the STB has
rulemaking authority.”
“Well, neither do you.”
“Gentlemen, please. Let‟s just move on, shall we?
Frank?”
“I think we are all operating in a vacuum here. If you
want to understand the optimal precision issue, you have to
go back and deal with the actual history of the ICC which
was the predecessor agency for the STB. When the ICC was
first founded back in 1887, it was decided that . . . .”
Frank went on at some length, recounting the history of
the ICC and the revolving door between the ICC and crack
Washington DC Law Firms. He then went on to recount a
few offhand statements by Felix Cohen who, while working
at Interior, really had nothing to say about the ICC.
(Neither did Justice Douglas.) One could tell that Therese
was looking for a way to cut Frank off because, given his
superannuated emeritus status, his comments could be
expected to go on at great length. They could also take
bizarre and occasionally disjunctive turns. In the end,
however, he would invariably wrap things up with a
didactic (albeit didactically vacant) account of his
termination as a member of the ALI. Something which he
felt was truly unjustified.
“O.K. Moving along. We have a lot of balls in the air.
Can we make some effort here at some sort of synthesis? I
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don‟t want to chill anyone‟s view. But I do think we are
heading towards something.”
“No, we‟re not.”
“Professor Z, would you like to intervene at this point
and suggest whether you can see a paper taking shape yet
from all this?”
“Well, I think the questions and comments are all truly
excellent. But I think there is yet much more to be asked
here.”
“Barbara?”
“I would like to ask whether the topic is itself
appropriately stated? Why precision? And why the STB?”
“Professor Z?”
“I do think there are some questions that will be beyond
the scope of the paper. My sense is that this may be one of
those. And I hope you understand, Barbara, that I say that
as a deep compliment.” Professor Z bowed his head and
leaned towards Barbara.
She beamed. From my seat in the rear, I thought I could
even detect the mildest blush on her cheeks. In truth, it
might have been the lighting.
It was at this point that I noticed Stan, the torts maven,
up at the front of the room. I could detect the beginning of
what we call “Stan‟s routine.” And I was a bit surprised to
see it emerge, because it did not seem to me that things had
taken a left-wing turn yet. Yes, Barbara was on the left and
yes, it was well known that Professor Z often traveled the
same paths, but still it did not seem to me obvious that any
left turn had been taken. At least not yet.
The initial moves of Stan‟s routine, however, clearly
suggested that he thought otherwise. Stan had obviously
finished eating—an enterprise which he keyed closely to the
speaker‟s politics and jurisprudential style. For anyone on
the left (and especially any theorist) Stan would make a
point of eating rather loudly, the fork and knife clinking
joyously on the white porcelain plate. Inexorably, these
demonstrative table manners would sooner or later cause
some food to spill. Then the real show would start. The spill
would be treated with acutely choreographed multi-stepped
procedures—a perfectly scaled and finely tuned response
ideal for a miniature hazmat incident. Stan would
invariably begin by rubbing the rosewood table with large,
slow circular motions far removed from the site of first
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contamination. From there, the sweeping action would
proceed in an inward spiral towards the hot zone—a piece of
salad or meat, perhaps spilled dressing. When contact was
made, the offending culinary debris would be scooped up
with the napkin and brought up to Stan‟s face for
inspection—presumably for identification. Sometimes,
further efforts at decontamination would be indicated and
the circular motions would recommence with renewed vigor.
Some were of the view that Stan actually intended to polish
the table, while others stuck to the decontamination
narrative. In any event, whenever Stan felt the hygienic
exigencies had been met, he would suddenly cross his arms,
recline brusquely in his chair and stare blankly at the
speaker. This would signify the end of the routine. Unless,
of course, the speaker was extremely far left, in which case,
Stan would display what we around the law school called
“speaker-specific narcolepsy.”
Going on and on at such length was precisely the point
of Stan‟s elaborate exercises. He was expressing a view on
the subject and the speaker, and his expression, when one
thinks about it (I invite such), was symbolically,
performatively, and metaphorically congruent—indeed so
perfectly congruent that all who noticed were of the view
that it was unconscious. No one believed Stan had the
wherewithal to do this consciously.
With the workshop sufficiently disrupted, I heard
Professor Z ask if the last question could be repeated.
“Yes, my name is Charles Bedford, and I have a threepart question. First, I just want to say that I think your
paper will be brilliant. But there are a number of problems
or challenges, as we might call them, that seem to be in the
offing. First, how do we define “rules?” I think if I were
doing it, I would do a search to discern the prevailing
definition. Second, when we define precision, how precise
should we be?” Charles‟s eyes twinkled. They were wet and
blinking. His voice lowered down to a whisper—as if he
were about to impart a delicious secret, some insight so
ethereal it is seldom ever thought, much less ever spoken:
“You see what I‟m getting at don‟t you?”
Professor Z seemed perplexed. Known to be a
consummate professional, however, his right hand quickly
went up to his chin and commenced the classic pensive
stroking. His gaze lifted to the ceiling and fastened on the
back of the room (where surely, if an answer were to be
found, that is the place it would be located). His left hand
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gracefully found its respective coat pocket, and he began to
leave the safe harbor of the podium to take up a slow motion
pace.
Roughly one third of faculty in attendance were
entranced—no doubt fully convinced that they were in the
presence of deep thought happening. Another third was
very likely evaluating Professor Z‟s performance for
credibility, style, and originality. And another third was no
doubt trying hard to commit to verbal and motor memory
Professor Z‟s performance of the “I-am-sent-into-very-deepthought-by-your-brilliant-question,” routine.
“I‟m not sure I see what you‟re getting at,” said
Professor Z. “Can you help me?”
Charles was flustered. His moment of public intellectual
intimacy—the moment that was supposed to reveal to all
present that Professor Z and he operated on the same
exalted intellectual plane, now lay in shards. How to
recover? “What I mean is that—Well, perhaps we should
talk about it at dinner.”
“O.K. One more question?”
Barbara again.
“What if there were no STB?”
Everyone laughed.
“No I mean . . . . Well, look, the ICC was abolished in
1995. It could happen again, you know.”
“Professor Z, do you see a paper now taking shape?”
“Yes, I believe I do. As I said before, the comments are
truly excellent. And certainly the law school is living up to
its well-deserved reputation.”
“So, can you tell us a bit about the paper as you see it?”
“We would start from the back end of course. We have to
end on a normative note—the law reviews, of course.” (Some
faculty snickered.) “So we end on a normative note—which
will, of course, entail an endorsement of optimality in
precision. That, obviously, is a given. The challenge is to
give some sort of novel and relatively concrete twist here on
the meaning or application of optimality. How then to do
that? Here I would have to do a bit of research (I‟m afraid
your questions don‟t answer everything).” A few faculty
laughed politely.
“My best guess is that no one will have thought about
optimality over the longue durée. I would argue, based on
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your questions, that optimal precision ought to be seen in
light of whether the rules (or standards) preserve the
regime in question from exogenous effects. The rules (or
standards) need to be sufficiently open to absorb, shall we
say, mildly disruptive exogenous effects (hence a certain
degree of vagueness) yet sufficiently closed to maintain
their identity and repel exogenous subversion. You see,” he
said, turning his hand delicately back and forth as if he
were fine-tuning the volume control on an expensive
amplifier, “Open and yet closed.”
“Do you believe that?”
Professor Z‟s response was so rapid, it spurted out
unfiltered: The man was clearly aghast. “Of course not! I
have no view on the issue. I try as much as possible not to
have a view on the issues on which I write. That way it
broadens the pool of available ideas, rhetoric, and
arguments. I am simply offering the kind of thesis that I
suspect no one has yet taken. If I am right about this, then
there are all sorts of possibilities open here to take on the
standard L&E literature, Diver & company. There will be
one section—I‟m thinking late—maybe Part IV, discussing
cognitive errors and biases.”
“But what about the STB—that seems to have dropped
out?”
“Right. I think the STB here will have to be a shill—a
completely compliant „substantive terrain‟ on which to play
out the various arguments and theories. The reason is
straightforward. As you asked your questions, I couldn‟t
help but notice that the STB seemed to drop out almost
entirely. I think that‟s a fairly unequivocal sign. The great
advantage here is that no one really knows very much about
the STB and no one really cares—so it will be easy to
convince readers that it is high time for a second look. At
the same time, of course, it‟s the great weakness of the piece
as well. To say it again: Who cares? There are no doubt
some cosmetics that can be added—starting the
introduction with, say, a railroading accident.”
“Couldn‟t you dispense with the STB altogether?”
“Well, certainly. But as the topic was introduced, I did
not really see that as a possibility.”
“Would you plan on selling this article or would you
credit yourself? Would you consider co-authorship?”
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“Well, I‟m sure we can discuss that with your ADR at
dinner. Thank you.”
***
I strolled back to my office. Before I even reached my
desk, I could see on the monitor, the unmistakable
imprimatur of the mauve and white SSRN article page—
with the SSRN logo and the ubiquitous abstract. I don‟t
know how it got there, but as I read the author line, I was
quite relieved. I began to read:
Stage 4
By Max Something or Other
Stage 4 is a stage beyond the formal rationality of law
described by Max Weber. It is beyond the critical descriptions of
instrumental reason of the Frankfurt School (or indeed Lyotard‟s
account of the postmodern condition). In Stage 4, legal academics
do not merely perform as if in a game. Instead, the game has
become the ontology of the enterprise. The game is gaming.
We can distinguish four stages leading to this development. In
Stage 1—a mythical and no doubt apocryphal moment—the legal
academic develops ideas in which he believes and publishes them.
In Stage 2, the legal academic compromises his ideas so that they
might attain a greater publicity and status. (The ideas, however,
are not completely abandoned.) In Stage 3, the legal academic
seeks publicity and status and thus selects and tailors his ideas
accordingly. In Stage 4, the legal academic has no ideas. He is,
however, willing to adopt any that will yield publicity and status.
The advent of Stage 4 signals a radical move beyond the more
primitive forms of academic arrivisme. In Stage 4, the idea that
belief would have anything to do with the game is a
demonstration that one has failed entirely to grasp the character
of the enterprise. In Stage 4, the game is gaming. There is no
moment that is not itself an instance of gaming.
Stage 4 appears to be an unstable state. It is arguably selfconsuming in the same way that late capitalism is self-consuming
(and possibly for the same kinds of reasons). In late capitalism,
the market colonizes and corrupts the coordination mechanisms
(politics, morality, culture, law) on which it depends. Stage 4
appears to be the manifestation of the same pattern on the plane
of thought, ideas, and beliefs.
This essay explores Stage 4 through the ubiquitous law school
institution known as the “faculty workshop.” Stage 4 is one that,
frankly, neither we nor anyone else anticipated. What we do
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anticipate, however, is that by the time this essay nears its end,
there will be no one left in a position to finish writing it, let alone
understand what it means. By all appearances, Stage 4 seems to
be a novel, virulent, and highly advanced form of weak nihilism.
The game is gaming. There is nothing else.

